










IIMI’s mission is to foster and support sustainable increases in the productivity of irrigated agri-
culture within the overall context of the water basin. In serving this mission, IIMI concentrates on
the integration of policies, technologies and management systems to achieve workable solutions
to real problems—practical, relevant results in the field of irrigation and water resources.
The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects—from computer modeling to
experience with water users associations—and vary in content from directly applicable research
to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately depends. Some research reports are
narrowly focused, analytical, and detailed empirical studies; others are wide-ranging and syn-
thetic overviews of generic problems.
Although  most of the reports are published by IIMI staff and their collaborators, we welcome
contributions from others. Each report is reviewed internally, by IIMI’s own staff  and Fellows,
and by external reviewers. The reports are published and distributed both in hard copy and
electronically (http://www.cgiar.org/iimi), and where possible all data and analyses will be avail-
able as separate downloadable files. Reports may be copied freely and cited with due acknowl-
edgment.16 Research Report
Irrigation Management Transfer in Mexico:
A Strategy to Achieve Irrigation District
Sustainability
Sam H. Johnson III
International Irrigation Management Institute
P O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri LankaThe author: Sam H. Johnson III is the former Program Leader, Mexico and Latin America, Interna-
tional Irrigation Management Institute. He is presently the Deputy Director of the Consortium
for International Development, 6367 East Tanque Verde, #200. Tucson, AZ. 85715.
IIMI’s research program in Mexico started in 1994 with encouragement and support from the
Ford Foundation, Mexico. Research is carried out in collaboration with the Comisión Nacional
del Agua, the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales y Agropecuarias, and the Colegio
de Postgraduados. IIMI is grateful to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (BMZ), Germany and the Ford Foundation for financial support for the research pro-
gram in Mexico.
Johnson, S. H. III. 1997. Management transfer in Mexico: A strategy to achieve irrigation district
sustainability. Research Report 16. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Irrigation Management In-
stitute.
/ irrigation management / privatization / participatory management / agricultural production / sustainability
/ private sector / public sector / economic aspects / water user associations / investment / agricultural policy
/ irrigated farming / water law / user charges / landownership / Mexico /
ISBN 92-9090-347-3
ISSN 1026-0862
© IIMI, 1997. All rights reserved.
Responsibility for the contents of this publication rests with the author.Contents
Summary       v
Introduction       1
Mexican Agricultural Policy       3
Irrigated Agriculture       6
Results of the Transfer Program       13
Future Transfer Issues       24
Conclusions       28
Literature Cited       29
iiiSummary
In Mexico, the percentage of irrigation operation
and maintenance costs paid by users declined
from 95 percent in the early 1950s to below 20
percent in the early 1980s. As a result of the short-
age of funds, the irrigation districts deferred
maintenance leading to a serious reduction in
output and decline in the infrastructure. To solve
this problem, in 1989, the government instituted
a program of transferring management from the
National Water Commission (CNA) to the water
users. The transfer program in Mexico took off
very quickly and by the end of 1996 more than 88
percent of the 3.3 million hectares of publicly ir-
rigated land in the country had been transferred
to joint management. Water user associations have
proven capable of jointly operating and maintain-
ing irrigation districts. Water tariffs collected by
the users (in excess of US$180 million in 1995)
have supported not only water user operation and
maintenance (O&M) activities but also the major-
ity of the O&M activities by CNA staff. In par-
ticular, maintenance activities carried out by the
water user associations have stopped the deterio-
ration in the infrastructure and hence have accom-
plished one of the major objectives of the transfer
program. To sustain the transferred districts, the
users need to establish an investment fund to
cover emergencies and future development. In
addition, it is necessary to clarify the water laws
to protect agricultural water rights.
v1
Privatization is often defined as a devel-
opment strategy involving the transfer of
function, activity, or organization from the
public sector to the private sector. Such a
strategy emerged in large part from a con-
clusion that growth and development are
severely limited by the intrinsic nature of
activities based on the public sector. As
such, it is argued that in their quest for
growth and development, developing-
countries must work proactively to place
the so-called “commanding heights” of the
economy in the hands of the private sec-
tor. Under this economic model, the pub-
lic sector is relegated to the setting of the
policy framework and the environment,
such that market forces can function (Davis
1993).
Over the past three decades, govern-
ments in both more-developed and less-
developed countries have transferred pub-
lic companies and other state enterprises
to the private sector. In many countries,
transfers have been initially concentrated
in the manufacturing and transportation
sectors, but privatization has now ex-
tended to almost all sectors of the economy,
including the provision of water services
such as potable water and irrigation
(ECLAC 1995). In Latin America and
Mexico, it is rather ironic that water-based
services should now be included in this
process as up to the early 1900s most such
services in the region were provided by the
private sector. Governments in the region
decided during the 1920s that water serv-
ices should be provided by the public sec-
tor, and in or after the 1940s they decided
that such services should normally be pro-
vided by agencies of the central govern-
ment rather than by the states (Lee 1990).
The primary reason used to justify in-
tervention in the provision of water serv-
ices was a belief, by both governments and
international donor agencies, that strong
government intervention in the economy
was required to ensure economic growth
and it also led to improved economic wel-
fare. Yet, stagnant growth and a failure of
the public sector to properly operate and
maintain the facilities led to a reversal of
this belief. In the 1970s, this ideology
changed as many countries decided that
the private provision of services is the most
efficient means of improving both eco-
nomic efficiency and social welfare. In the
case of irrigation, this involves transferring
responsibility for irrigation operation and
maintenance (O&M) from the public agen-
cies to water user associations.
Using data from the irrigation transfer
program in Mexico, this report takes this
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argument one step further to show that
transfer to groups of users of the rights to
the net benefits generated by public irriga-
tion investment is a means of maintaining
economic returns to public investment. In
cases where the groups of users also ac-
cept responsibility for maintenance, this
may be a necessity to ensure sustainability
of the infrastructure. The case of Mexico is
very important as the country has demon-
strated that it is possible to quickly trans-
fer large public irrigation systems to groups
of users. The success of the Mexico trans-
fer program and its reputation have at-
tracted visiting study tour groups from all
over the world. Their interest in the pro-
gram and its success attests to the global
importance of the Mexico model.
Over time it has been demonstrated
that the lack of political will to charge the
full O&M costs, not to mention the invest-
ment costs, to users of irrigation facilities,
complicated by the inability of govern-
ments to provide the required O&M funds
from the public budget, often results in a
situation where public infrastructure is un-
sustainable over time (World Bank 1994a).
This is particularly true with public irriga-
tion schemes. It is very easy to find cases
of schemes that were developed with de-
sign lives of 50 years, yet have had to be
rehabilitated in less than 10 years (Johnson
1990). After watching this cycle of devel-
opment and decay for more than 40 years,
a number of governments in Latin
America, Mexico, and the Caribbean have
decided to transfer management respon-
sibility to user associations to try to ensure
sustainability of the infrastructure
(PLANIMAR 1995).
Material presented in this report de-
tails the process of transfer of public irri-
gation districts in Mexico from public own-
ership to joint management, where respon-
sibility for irrigation O&M is shared be-
tween the public irrigation agency and the
water user associations. The first two sec-
tions present an overview of agricultural
policy and irrigated agriculture in the
country while the third section describes
the irrigation management transfer pro-
gram in the country. The fourth section
examines results of the transfer program
in terms of impacts on financing of O&M,
staffing changes, production costs, and
maintenance expenditures. This section
draws on more general data for the entire
country as well as specific data from two
irrigation districts, Alto Rio Lerma Irriga-
tion District (near Celaya in central
Mexico—transferred in 1992) and Region
Lagunera Irrigation District (near Torreon
in northern Mexico—transfer started in
1991), where IIMI is carrying out long-term
field research. The final section discusses
future changes needed to maintain the sys-
tems.3
Agricultural policy changes in the coun-
try occurred during two distinct periods:
a period of  heavy government subsidies
after the revolution and a period of eco-
nomic liberalization introduced since the
late 1980s. Agriculture has played a cen-
tral role in Mexico’s economic develop-
ment plans. These plans have been based
on cheap energy from Mexico’s petroleum
reserves, cheap labor from the rural sec-
tor, and cheap food obtained through the
use of highly subsidized agricultural in-
puts.
Government Intervention
After the end of World War II, as part of
the revolutionary creed that argued a
strong government presence was needed
to ensure economic growth and provide
increased social welfare, the Government
of Mexico has used both direct and indi-
rect policies to intervene in the agriculture
sector. In the process, the government es-
tablished marketing and input supply
parastatals, imposed import controls, guar-
anteed producer prices, mandated produc-
tion targets for growers, invested in irri-
gation and other infrastructure, restricted
land transactions and agricultural markets,
and subsidized fertilizers, farm credit, ag-
ricultural water, and crop insurance
(Gorriz, Subramanian, and Simas 1995).
Until the late 1980s, the main goal of Mexi-
co’s agricultural pricing policy was to keep
prices low for consumers, yet ensure high
prices for producers. Prices were guaran-
teed for 12 major crops: maize, bean,
wheat, barley, rice, sorghum, soybean, saf-
flower, cottonseed, copra, sunflower, and
sesame, as long as they were marketed
through a government marketing channel.
For 1991, de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Gordillo
de Anda (1995) calculated a nominal rate
of protection of 77 percent for maize, a pro-
ducer subsidy equivalent (PSE) of US$92
for white maize and $71 for yellow maize—
a result of various government interven-
tion programs for staple crops. In contrast,
in the United States and Canada, the PSE
was US$28 for white maize and $21 for
yellow maize.
Liberalization
Mexico’s entry  into two international ac-
cords-the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-(has
altered its trade policy. Under NAFTA, 42
percent of tariff codes were liberalized,
with tariffs on foodstuffs and cotton to be
phased out over a period of 15 to 20 years.
These phaseouts are consistent with GATT
agreements regarding reduced agricultural
protection for developing countries (World
Bank 1995). Mexico’s willingness to join
NAFTA and GATT signifies that there has
been an ideological change in the country.
It is now felt that the government should
not be involved in agricultural production;
efficiency and welfare will improve with
increased private involvement. As a result,
starting in 1989, guaranteed prices were
replaced with market agreement prices for
all commodities except bean and maize,
and the government began implementing
reforms to reduce general food subsidies.
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The only basic food products still benefit-
ing from targeted consumption subsidies
include maize flour, tortillas, and milk
(World Bank 1995).
It should be emphasized that the Mexi-
can divestment program was not imple-
mented solely as a result of GATT and
NAFTA, but had actually started in 1983.
After expanding from 391 public enter-
prises (covering all sectors) in 1970 to 1,155
in 1982—where enterprises run the range
from parastatals to commercial firms—the
government shifted its view of the role that
the public sector should play in the
economy. Therefore, starting with the sale
of some of the smaller public firms in 1983,
the government instituted a divestment
program. The sale of larger firms dates from
1988 when transfer of mines, steel indus-
try, airlines, the telephone company, and
commercial banks was instituted. As can
be seen in table 1, the number of firms in
the hands of the government was reduced
from 1,155 to 280 during the period Decem-
ber 1982 to December 1990.
With almost 10 years of experience in
privatization, Mexico had confidence in its
ability to reduce the government’s role in
the economy, including agriculture. From
1989 onward, under President Salinas de
Gortari, Mexico instituted bold agricul-
tural reforms on many different fronts, in-
cluding:
l privatization of most parastatals in
marketing, fertilizers, seeds, insurance,
and the provision of other inputs used
to transfer massive subsidies to
agriculture
l extensive reorganization of the
financial sector with reprivatization of
commercial banks
l elimination of credit subsidies
l elimination of the national basic
commodities board’s (CONASUPO)
monopoly over the marketing of basic
foods except maize and bean sharp
reductions of public budgets for
agricultural research and extension
services with private delivery and the
charging of user fees expected to
substitute for free public extension
services
l gradual transfer of the management of
irrigation districts to water user asso-
ciations with the introduction of
sharply increased fees for water use
(Salinas de Gortari 1991).
TABLE 1.
Privatization of public firms in Mexico: December 1982 to December 1990.
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Decentralized institutions 102 87 95 96 94 94  89 88 82
Firms with major state
     participation 744 700 703 629 528 437 252 229 147
State trust funds 231 199 173 147 108 83 71 62 51
Firms with minor state
     participation 78 78 78 69 7 3 0 0 0
Total 1155 1074 1049 941 737 617 412 379 280
Source: Rodriguez  1992, p. 158.5
Given the extent of the overall policy
changes in the economy, reforms in the ir-
rigation sector must be viewed against the
backdrop of the larger set of agricultural
policy reforms that have been instituted
since the late 1980s.
Legal Changes
Agriculture has played an important po-
litical role as land reform was a major com-
ponent of the revolution of 1910. As a re-
sult of land confiscated during the revolu-
tion and subsequently distributed to the
workers, more than half the cultivated land
in Mexico are ejidos (land reform commu-
nities) where the farmers can use the land
but cannot own or sell it. Until 1992, ejido
farmers had permanent and hereditary use
rights but could not transfer these rights
through sale, and thus could not pledge
their land as collateral for guaranteeing
credit. Due to the legal status of the ejido
land, farmers in the ejidos have not had
access to improved agricultural technology
and credit and, hence, over half the culti-
vated land in Mexico has had a very low
productivity.
To facilitate the transfer of public irri-
gation districts, article 27 of the constitu-
tion was modified in 1992 so that farmers
in ejidos could be given the right to form
associations and to rent and sell their wa-
ter and land rights as well as pledge their
land as collateral for loans (Foley 1995). In
addition, the national water law was re-
vised so that water rights were clarified
and the possibility for selling and leasing
water to higher-value uses was established
(Comisión Nacional del Agua 1992;
Rosegrant and Gazmuri 1994a). These
measures were meant to encourage invest-
ment and productivity on the assumption
that security of tenure will ensure increased
capitalization and that productivity gains
in agriculture can only be achieved through
realizing economies of scale (Salinas de
Gortari 1992).
Terms of Trade
Over the past 10 years, the terms of trade
of agriculture changed drastically. During
this period, with the removal of the subsi-
dies on inputs and the elimination of most
price guarantee programs, profitability of
grain crops declined to only around 30 per-
cent of what it was in 1984 (figure 1). Net
returns for maize, wheat, and sorghum
suffered serious declines over the 10 years
from 1984 to 1994. This trend poses a threat
to the ability of users, particularly the small
private growers and members of the ejidos,
to continue to pay the water fees needed
to sustain the transferred irrigation sys-
tems. Reduced economic returns often en-
courage users to underfund O&M
(Svendsen and Vermillion 1993).6
Mexico has a vast land area of approxi-
mately two million square kilometers. Over
75 percent of the country is classified as arid
and semiarid and water is the constraining
agricultural production factor in many ar-
eas. The annual rainfall of over 40 percent
of the country is under 500 millimeters. As
a result, the total cropped land is only
around 20 million hectares, with about 10
million hectares farmed by members of
ejidos and 10 million hectares farmed by
private growers. With such a large extent
of arid land, irrigation plays a critical role
in terms of overall agricultural production.
Within the agriculture sector, irrigated land
contributes about 50 percent of the total
value of agricultural production and ac-
counts for about 70 percent of agricultural
exports. Productivity of irrigated land is 2.3
times that of rain-fed land (Espinosa de
León and Trava Manzanilla 1992) while the
value of agricultural production from irri-
gated land is 3.2 times that of the produc-
tion from rain-fed land (Comisión Nacional
del Agua 1996b).
Irrigation has been practiced in Mexico
since pre-Hispanic times, with many small
diversions and canals built to meet the ag-
ricultural needs of the population. It has
been estimated that at the beginning of the
revolution there were approximately 1.2
million hectares of irrigated land. Much of
this land had been developed by various
land companies, mainly American, for the
purpose of growing plantation crops such
as sugarcane and cotton. The constitution
of 1917 nationalized the country’s water
resources and all of these irrigation systems
became the responsibility of the state. To
manage irrigation in the country, an Ir-
Irrigated Agriculture
FIGURE 1.
Changes in profitability (1984-1994) in the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation Disttrict: Wheat, maize and
sorghum.*
* In constant 1994 US dollars (US$ 1.00 = Mexican pesos 3.4)7
rigation Directorate was established in the
Department of Agriculture and Develop-
ment, followed by the National Irrigation
Commission in 1926 that was given respon-
sibility for all irrigation affairs. During the
period 1926 to 1934, the first large, public
irrigation districts were established in the
country (Comisión Nacional de Irrigación
1940). Although in the 1930s irrigation de-
velopment was slow, by 1960 the agricul-
tural census reported a total of 4.3 million
hectares in the country (Trava 1994).
Irrigation Districts
Irrigation districts were created and devel-
oped as part of the public policy to foster
food grain self-sufficiency. These were
large public irrigation systems (50,000-
300,000 ha) that were operated by the gov-
ernment irrigation agency with little direct
involvement of the users in the operation
and maintenance of the district. By the end
of 1982, the total land area under irriga-
tion was 5.3 million hectares. By the late
1980s, Mexico had approximately 6 million
hectares in irrigation, with 3.3 million hec-
tares in public irrigation districts (figure
2) and the remaining 2.7 million hectares
in 27,000 communal and private irrigation
units with approximately 50 percent of
these served by small reservoirs. Table 2
details the distribution of the public irri-
gation districts in Mexico by size. At the
end of the 1980s, Mexico had approxi-
mately 1,300 storage dams, 2,100 diversion
dams, 68,000 km of canals, 47,000 km of
TABLE 2.
Distribution of public irrigation districts in Mexico by size.
Range of area (ha) No. of districts Total area (ha)
<10,000  24 131,900
10,001 - 50,000 39 980,821
50,001 - 100,000  9 690,256
100,001 - 200,000 3  374,817
>200,001 5  1,158,377
Total  80  3,336,171
Source: World Bank 1994b.
FIGURE 2.
Irrigated and rain-fed areas, and IIMI reserch sites in Mexico.8
drains, 54,000 km of service roads, and over
60,000 deep irrigation wells (World Bank
1991).
Initially, the costs of administration and
O&M of the irrigation districts were paid
by the government and the farmers, the
latter through water fees. Over time, the
percentage of total irrigation O&M costs
covered by farmer contributions declined.
As can be seen in figure 3, in the early 1950s,
farmers were paying above 85 percent of
the actual O&M and administrative costs,
but by the early 1980s, farmer contribution
to the budget had fallen to less than 20 per-
cent1 (Espinosa de León and Trava
Manzanilla 1992). The remainder of the
budget was being paid by public expendi-
ture, although in most cases, maintenance
activities were deferred due to lack of funds
(World Bank 1991). No precise estimates are
available for the amounts and volumes of
work needed for deferred maintenance,
although a World Bank 1983 publication
estimated the overall costs would be
US$3.5 billion (in 1981 dollars).
The golden era of rapid irrigation de-
velopment was stopped by the financial
and resulting budgetary crisis of August
1982. With the collapse of the peso (Mexi-
can pesos), and the resulting devaluation,
investment funds for new irrigation sys-
tems as well as funds for the maintenance
of the existing systems were not available.
Throughout the rest of the 1980s public in-
vestment funds were scarce such that, in
nominal terms, public investment in the
sector declined from US$3,600 million in
1981 to $230 million in 1990. In 1988, in-
vestment in irrigation infrastructure was
less than 3 percent of total public invest-
ment compared with around 10 percent in
1978 (Gorriz 1995). As a result, the rate of
expansion of irrigated land, which had
reached an average of nearly 150,000 hec-
FIGURE 3.
Percentage cost recovery of irriagtion districts in Mexico 1947-90.*
*Data provided by CNA.
1Irrigation fees varied
between US$2 and $3
per irrigation between
the mid-1960s and the
early 1980s.9
tares per year in 1979-81, was reduced to
less than 5,000 hectares per year in 1988
(World Bank 1991).
The reduction in public funding for
O&M led to deterioration in the perform-
ance of the irrigation systems. Between 1982
and 1987, irrigated agricultural production
declined at an average rate of 0.4 percent
per annum (World Bank 1991). The eco-
nomic crisis not only reduced the availabil-
ity of funds for new irrigation investment
but also significantly constrained govern-
ment funds available for maintenance. By
the end of the decade, around 800,000 hec-
tares of irrigated land were estimated to be
out of production or being used only at a
reduced level due to deterioration of the
infrastructure. Another 1.5 million hectares
required rehabilitation to bring overall sys-
tem efficiency back to its original level
(Figueroa Hernandez 1992). In some dis-
tricts unionized employees were starting to
demand extra compensation for working
in excess of 8 hours during a day while
improper use of maintenance equipment
had become chronic as  lack of budgetary
funds resulted in the machinery being used
less than one-third of its normal schedule
(Trava 1994). Consequently, at the end of
the 1980s, the 3.3 million hectares of land
served by public irrigation systems were
under heavy stress.
Irrigation Management Transfer
In 1989, recognizing the problems in the
irrigation subsector (World Bank 1989), as
part of the National Development Plan
(1989–1994), the government created the
National Water Commission (CNA). CNA
was created with an explicit mandate to
define a new policy for the management of
the waters of the country. This led to the
development of the National Program for
Decentralization of the Irrigation Districts
under the National Development Plan.
The National Program for Decentrali-
zation of the Irrigation Districts (or the
transfer program) was designed to estab-
lish a system of co-responsibility between
CNA and the water users where the 80
public irrigation systems would become fi-
nancially self-sufficient (Espinosa de León
and Trava Manzanilla 1992). Phase I of the
transfer program gradually shifted govern-
ment-managed irrigation districts to the
water user associations (WUAs), with each
WUA being responsible for O&M within a
module. In the context of the Mexican
transfer program, a module is defined as
an irrigated area that usually starts at the
secondary canal intake and extends to the
individual farm intakes. Depending on the
size of a district, there can be from 4 to 60
modules within an irrigation district.
Modules were formed as legal civil as-
sociations with a concession granted by the
government that allows the module to use
the associated irrigation infrastructure as
well as have a right to use the water that is
allocated to the district. CNA retains re-
sponsibility for managing the water source
and the main canal. The transfer program
was explicitly designed to reduce govern-
ment subsidies to the transferred districts
to zero. As a result, it was necessary to in-
crease user water fees to cover all O&M
and administrative costs, including the
costs incurred by CNA in operating the
water source and the main canal.
Phase II of the transfer program cre-
ates Limited Responsibility Societies
(SLRs), which are federations of the indi-
vidual modules within a single district.
SLRs are legal entities and are responsible
for operating all the main canals, drains,10
and roads of the irrigation district. The idea
is that SLRs would also have the capability
to pool the maintenance equipment pro-
vided to the modules and thus have econo-
mies of scale in the use of equipment. Once
SLRs are in place, CNA is responsible for
managing the water source itself, as well
as playing a larger role in overall water re-
source planning and development in the
country.
The decision to implement the transfer
program was made at the highest level of
the government, the Office of the President.
In general, this decision was strongly sup-
ported by the farmers in the more commer-
cial irrigated areas in the country, prima-
rily in the Northwest where more than 45
percent of the irrigated area in the country
is located. Farmer support was based on
the recognition that the irrigation systems
were only going to get worse as the gov-
ernment did not have the funds to prop-
erly operate and maintain them. As a re-
sult, in a number of these districts, groups
of growers had approached the govern-
ment and requested that management re-
sponsibility for O&M of the public irriga-
tion districts be transferred to the water
users.
Consequently, when the transfer pro-
gram started, the initial systems trans-
TABLE 3.
Program of transfer (1990-1992).
District No. Region District name Total area Transferred area
(ha)  (ha)
10 Northwest Río Culiacán, Sin. 272,807 272,807
14 Northwest Río Colorado, B.C. y Son. 206,350 38,447
38 Northwest Río Mayo, Son. 97,046 97,046
41 Northwest Río Yaqui, Son. 232,944 232,944
63 Northwest Guasave, Sin. 100,125 100,125
75 Northwest Río Fuerte, Sin. 207,888 207,888
76 Northwest Valle del Carrizo, Sin. 43,259 43,259
108 Northwest Elota-Piaxtla, Sin. 18,256 18,256
01 Northeast Pabellón, Ags. 11,938 11,938
05 North Delicias, Chih. 75,220 75,220
17 North Región Lagunera, Coah. y Dgo. 94,670 28,377
26 Northeast Bajo Río San Juan, Tamps. 86,102 84,984
11 Lerma-Balsas Alto Río Lerma 112,772 112,772
13 Lerma-Balsas Estado de Jalisco 51,110 29,618
23 Lerma-Balsas San Juan del Río, Qro. 11,048 10,447
85 Lerma-Balsas La Begoña, Gto. 10,823 10,823
87 Lerma-Balsas Rosario-Mezquite, Mich. 67,570 12,530
94 Lerma-Balsas Jalisco Sur, Jal. 12,346 9,817
Total 1,712,274 1,397,298
Source: Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA) 1995b.
Notes: Ags. = Aguascalientes Dgo. = Durango Qro.         = Queretaro
B.C. = Baja California Gto. = Guanajuato Sin.         =  Sinaloa
Chih. = Chihuahua Jal. = Jalisco Son.        =  Sonora
Coah. = Coahuila Mich. = Michoacan Tamps.   =   Tamaulipas11
ferred were concentrated in the more com-
mercial areas. The clear bias toward larger
systems in the Northwest is obvious from
the data presented in table 3. As can be seen
in table 3, of the first systems transferred,
while most of the transferred districts in
the Northwest were around 100,000 hec-
tares and larger, only the Alto Lerma in the
Lerma-Balsas region was in excess of
100,000 hectares. By concentrating on an
area where the program had strong local
support as well as an area where the sys-
tems were relatively large, Mexico was able
to jump-start the transfer process. It proved
that transfer of O&M responsibility to large
associations was a viable strategy. More
than 2.45 million hectares were transferred
from 1990 to 1994 exceeding  a target of 1.96
million hectares (Comisión Nacional del
Agua 1995).
Irrigation Modules
The Mexico transfer program is built
around the creation of irrigation modules,
operated by WUAs, which are legal civil
associations under Mexican law. Modules
cover a specified service area. The physi-
cal boundaries of a module are based on
(Trava 1994):
l Hydraulic considerations. Water delivery
to the area should be easy and efficient
to accomplish and, where possible, fit
within existing irrigation sections as the
control structures are already in place.
l Social aspects. In cases where there were
irreconcilable differences between
groups, such as between two ejidos or
an ejido and a private grower,
adjustments should be made to try to
minimize such conflicts as long as the
hydraulic conditions could still be met.
l Economic concerns. The module should
not be of an uneconomic size and
consequently unable to pay its O&M
costs. In Mexico, it was found that the
minimum size is around 4,000 hectares
with larger modules more cost-effective
as long as they did not get too large with
resulting social and organizational
problems.
To persuade users to accept the trans-
fer program as well as to encourage them
to agree to the proposed module bounda-
ries, a very intensive program of promo-
tion was organized by CNA. This included
the use of audiovisual materials prepared
by the Mexican Institute of Water Technol-
ogy (IMTA) as well as a number of promo-
tion teams contracted from the private sec-
tor. In late 1989 and early 1990, the first
modules were formed and responsibility
for O&M in the irrigation districts was
transferred to WUAs. Initially, the modules
were relatively small (around 2,000 to 5,000
ha) as it was felt these would be easier for
the users to manage. However, with expe-
rience it became obvious modules that
were too small could not afford the fixed
overhead costs of administering O&M in
the area. The fixed staff and facilities costs
were too great for the size of the service
area and therefore the water fees were too
high for farmers to afford to pay them.
Consequently, to have a viable manage-
ment size the districts that have been trans-
ferred more recently have much larger
modules (5,000-50,000 ha) than those in the
districts transferred earlier.
For example, the Rio Yaqui Irrigation
District in Sonora with 22,056 users was
one of the first districts transferred in 1991.
The service area of 232,944 hectares was
divided into 51 modules with an average
size of 4,500 hectares. In contrast, Alto Rio12
Lerma Irrigation District with 22,676 users
and a service area of 112,772 hectares was
transferred in 1992 and divided into 11
modules each with an average size of
10,000 hectares. Similarly, the Rio Mayo Ir-
rigation District with 11,563 users and an
area of 97,051 hectares was transferred in
1990 and divided into 16 modules each
with an average size of 6,000 hectares. The
Culiacan-Humaya Irrigation District with
27,499 users and 272,807 hectares was
transferred between 1991 and 1992, and
divided into 16 modules each with an av-
erage size of 17,000 hectares.
Legal Framework
In contrast to many countries, particularly
those in Asia (Korten and Siy 1988), that
first attempted to create water user asso-
ciations (WUAs) at the block level (100-500
ha), Mexico decided to create them at the
module level with no formal structure be-
low this level. According to Mexican civil
law, the General Assembly is the WUAs’
supreme authority. However, as the
number of users within a single association
may be in excess of 5,000 farmers and, as it
is difficult to bring members of such a large
group all together in an assembly meeting,
the law allows for the appointment of del-
egates representing subareas within the
module. These delegates represent indi-
vidual farmer interests at the General As-
sembly level. Rules to select delegates vary
within the different districts and even
across modules within a district. These are
decided by the local users. Some possible
rules for selecting delegates are:
• one delegate per ejido and one delegate
to represent the private producers
• two delegates for each ejido and two to
represent private producers
• one delegate for every 100 ejido farmers
• two delegates for each irrigation
section, one to represent the ejido
farmers and the other to represent the
private producers
The selection rule is based on the so-
cial structure in the particular module and
can vary from module to module within a
single district.
Another aspect of the Mexican model
is that the water concession granted by the
government is part of the legal agreement
between the government and the module
(the water user association). As such, the
users do not have individual water rights
but instead each association has a propor-
tional right (the proportion is based on
area) to the supply of water (normally the
estimated surface supply) available to the
district for that season. Concessions are for
a fixed time frame, 5 to 50 years, and can
be taken away if an association does not
fulfill its agreement with the government
(i.e., CNA). Concessions are not for a fixed
volume of water but are for the use of a
proportion of the available water supply.
Therefore, the associations do not have a
firm, volumetric water right as is found in
the US. It must be emphasized that even
after a Limited Responsibility Society (SLR)
is formed, the concession is still in the name
of the association and the SLR is only
granted authority to manage water by the
individual associations.
Many of the districts also have
groundwater systems, including private
wells and public wells (that are usually in-
cluded in the transfer program), and it is
not unusual for a district to have access to
water from more than one reservoir.
Groundwater well concessions are granted
by CNA. The concessions granted are de-
signed to reflect the estimated annual re-13
charge and thus maintain a steady
groundwater level. Since groundwater lev-
els are falling in almost all the major agri-
cultural areas in the country, this system is
not working (Cummings et al. 1989).
Role of CNA
At the beginning of each season, it is the
responsibility of CNA to estimate overall
water availability for the coming season (in-
cluding groundwater quantities). This in-
formation is provided to the district. A hy-
draulic committee that includes the head
of the district and head of operations from
the district (both CNA employees) as well
as a representative from each module is
responsible for coming to an agreement
concerning the water allocation plan for the
season or year, as the case may be, and also
for developing a water program for irriga-
tion deliveries. In addition, when there is a
critical decision required, usually the hy-
drologic committee meets to make this de-
cision, although normally it only meets 2-
4 weeks before the beginning of the season
to develop the seasonal irrigation plan.
Also as part of the transfer program,
CNA transferred the majority of the main-
tenance equipment to the modules so that
the latter would have the equipment re-
quired to maintain their respective ditches
and drains. Access to maintenance equip-
ment was a strong incentive for farmers to
accept the transfer program as they real-
ized that without the equipment they could
not maintain the systems. However, as
much of this equipment was very old and
in poor condition, many of the modules
purchased additional equipment for main-
tenance as well as for carrying out agricul-
tural tasks such as land leveling using la-
sers to help increase irrigation efficiencies
in the module.
The transfer program was designed to pro-
mote institutional change in the districts,
to move from publicly managed govern-
ment irrigation systems toward self-suffi-
cient systems managed by local WUAs
(Trava 1994). As the irrigated districts con-
tain some of the most productive agricul-
tural areas in the country, the overall thrust
of the program was to ensure that these
areas continued to be highly productive by
keeping the irrigation systems in operat-
ing condition. Over time it was expected
that agricultural production would con-
tinue to increase, but that was not the pri-
mary objective.
The Mexican transfer program was de-
signed to:
l ensure sustainability of the irrigated
districts
l reduce the financial burden on the
government
l pass responsibility for O&M to the
users
l increase efficiency of the use of water,
and improve and sustain system
performance
l reduce the number of public employees
in the irrigation districts
Results of the Transfer Program14
By December 1996, under the transfer
program, 2.92 million hectares had been
transferred to 386 modules. This represents
88 percent of the service areas in the 80 ir-
rigation districts and involves 422,474 us-
ers (CNA 1996a). In 59 districts, the gov-
ernment has transferred responsibility for
O&M and administration for all the sec-
ondary canals and those below them and
for drains and roads. In another 14 districts
the government is in the process of trans-
ferring management responsibility. Addi-
tionally, the program has created 8 Limited
Responsibility Societies (SLRs) that have
grouped together 108 of the modules in 7
of the larger districts in the country. These
cover in excess of 855,000 hectares of irri-
gated land (Comisión Nacional del Agua
1996a). The government has also created a
National Association of Users of Irrigation
(ANUR), an organization for grouping the
modules together. When functioning ac-
tively, ANUR is expected to serve as an
official voice for the modules, help with
human resource development, and serve
as a mechanism for the modules to access
credit and technical  assistance (Palacios-
Valez 1995).
Financial Impacts on O&M
Funding
The transfer program was designed to en-
sure water user associations had adequate
financial resources to be self-sufficient. This
meant that the irrigation fees or water tar-
iffs had to reach a level where the costs of
operation, administration, and mainte-
nance at the module level were covered. In
addition, the water tariffs had to be suffi-
cient to meet the modules’ share of the costs
of operations, administration, and mainte-
nance at the main canal and water source
level as well. As the modules became fi-
nancially self-sufficient, the subsidy from
the federal government was to be reduced
to zero. This requirement is clearly stated
in the concession agreement signed be-
tween each association and CNA.
Table 4 presents three examples of the
base budgets negotiated between CNA and
modules in three irrigation districts. These
budgets clearly specify what percentage of
the irrigation fees should be paid to CNA
and what percentage of the fees is retained
by the module. This agreement is signed
by CNA and the representatives of the
modules at the time the concession agree-
ment is signed. The wide variation in wa-
ter fees (table 4) reflects the differences in
water availability, cropping intensity, and
operating costs in the individual irrigation
districts.
All of the transferred modules have a
similar agreed-upon base budget designed
to achieve financial self-sufficiency. These
budgets were developed through an exten-
sive series of negotiations and often the
amount proposed by CNA was reduced by
the associations. For example, in the case
of Rio Fuerte Irrigation District (235,914 ha)
in Sinaloa, although CNA proposed a
budget of around US$11, 875,000 (Mexican
pesos 38 million) for self-sufficiency, the
users only agreed to a budget of $9,375,000
(Mexican pesos 30 million).
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of
the irrigation service fees between CNA
and the water users for the Alto Rio Lerma
Irrigation District for 1995.
Using the base budget of the conces-
sion agreements for the transferred dis-
tricts as well as an estimated required
budget for the non-transferred systems, a
total “normal” budget for operating and1
5
TABLE 4.
Base budget for financial self-sufficiency for three modules agreed and signed between CNA and module officers (1993 US dollars 1).
Module name and Area          Minor canals         Principal canals        Headworks    Administration  Total
irrigation district (ha) charges budget  (1993 US dollars)
Operations Maintenance Operations Maintenance Operations Maintenance WUA CNA Total
Mod. II-1 2 10,000 54,677 118,132 23,433 44,323 18,519 15,379 114,319 287,127 101,655 388,782
La Antigua
Irrigation District
Module Cortazar 3 18,448 82,625 363,093 23,875 76,312 4,062 29,594 39,026 452,799 165,788 618, 587
Alto Rio Lerma
Irrigation District
Module V 4 4,391 89,250 42,812 13,050 37,369 666 2,825 24,912 153,187 57,697 210,884
Region Lagunera
Irrigation District
1Converted to 1993 US dollars at new pesos 3.2 = 1 US dollar—differences from original due to roundoff errors.
2Based on an assumption of an annual net volume of 162,825,000 m 3 at US$2.34/1000 m 3.
3Based on an assumption of an annual net volume of 63,510,000 m 3 at US$9.74/1000 m 3.
4Based on an assumption of an annual net volume of 46,200,000 m 3 at US$4.29/1000 m 3.
Sources: Original water user association and civil association documents for the respective modules.16
transfer from CNA. In other cases, the staff
were considered dishonest or incompetent.
Where the unions were very strong, the
modules did not want to hire union em-
ployees as union action was one of the
major problems during CNA’s operation
of the irrigation system.
One clear impact of the transfer proc-
ess is a reduction in the number of CNA
employees working in O&M in irrigation
(table 6). From 1990 to mid-1994, 42 per-
cent of the CNA personnel involved in ir-
rigation O&M were retired or released.
This reduction primarily impacted on CNA
staff at the secondary canal level. It also
led to a reduction in CNA’s staffing levels
at the district office. In some cases, this re-
duction was in administrative personnel
but in others it actually eliminated some
of the more experienced operational per-
sonnel in the district, with direct impacts
on the management of the irrigation sys-
tem.3 In the case of Alto Rio Lerma Irriga-
tion District, the 280 CNA staff prior to
transfer in 1992 came  down to less than
100 in the district in 1996. In Rio Mayo
          2A small number of
pump irrigation sys-
tems with water fees
in excess of US$300/
ha artificially in-
crease this value. Ex-
cluding these, the av-
erage water cost is
around US$40/ha
per year. (US$ values
are in constant 1993
dollars where US$1.0
=  Mexican pesos
3.2.)
maintaining all the 80 irrigation districts
in Mexico is estimated (table 5). In 1993,
this budget was calculated at US$190 mil-
lion (Mexican pesos 609.54 million). With
a service area of around 3.2 million hec-
tares, this works out on the average to ap-
proximately US$60 per hectare per year.2
As can be seen in table 5, US$149 million
(78% of the total budget) was paid by the
users as water fees. The transfer program
and the associated increases in water tar-
iffs have allowed the irrigation districts to
go from 37 percent self-sufficiency in 1991
to 80 percent self-sufficiency in 1994.
Staffing Impacts
Responsibility for O&M from the second-
ary canals down was transferred to the
modules. In the process, the employees
who worked for CNA were to be hired by
the modules if the latter felt they were
needed and were competent, or they were
to be released. In many cases, the module
administrators realized they could not af-
ford to take all the staff involved in the
FIGURE 4.
Distribution of irrigation service fees, the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District (No.
011),1995.
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Degree of self-sufficiency by region (in constant 1993 dollars).
Irrigation Area Normal budget Fee collection (US$1,000) Budget      Self-sufficiency
region (ha) (US$1,000) shortfall (%)
(US$1,000)
For CNA For   WUAs Total
Northwest-transferred 988,248 44,868 9,801 35,067 44,868 0 100
Northwest 501,670 75,618 8,842 46,811 55,653 19,965 73.6
North-transferred 87,158 3,819 1,453 2,366 3,820 0 100
North 229,944 9,450 3,183 3,045 6,228 3,221 65.9
Northeast-transferred 128,668 5,110 1,743 3,367 5,110 0 100
Northeast 435,955 16,038 6,672 1,932 8,603 7,435 53.6
Lerma-Balsas-transferred 144,370 5,345 1,345 4,000 5,345 0 100
Lerma-Balsas 395,006 48,701 4,792 3,332 8,124 9,327 46.6
Valley Mex-transferred. 25,018 457 125 323 457 0 100
Valley Mex. 160,599 6,246 1,496 609 2,105 4,141 33.7
Southeast-transferred 16,028 1,303 242 1,124 1,366 0 100
Southeast 79,176 4,775 406 777 1,184 3,592 24.7
Total transferred 1,260,822 60,965 14,709 46,256 60,965 0 100
Total  non-transferrd 1,931,218 129,516 25,269 62,741 88,010 41,506 32
Total for all districts 3,192,040 190,481 39,978 108,997 148,975 41,506 78.2
Note: US$1.0 =  Mexican pesos 3.2.18
Irrigation District, the 319 employees prior
to transfer in 1990 came down to 169 em-
ployees after transfer.
However, in some districts the reduc-
tion in CNA staff did not necessarily mean
a reduction in overall staff; it simply meant
a change in the number of public employ-
ees. For example, in the Lagunera Irriga-
tion District there were 90 ditch tenders
and 324 other employees in 1990—all pub-
lic employees of CNA. After transfer, in
1995 there were 107 ditch tenders and 119
other workers employed by the respective
modules, and 49 ditch tenders and 219
other workers still employed by CNA.
Thus after transfer there are now 494 em-
ployees in Lagunera compared to 414 prior
to transfer. However, it must be pointed
out that only 17 of the 20 modules have
been transferred in Lagunera and thus the
number of CNA employees is higher than
it is expected to be after complete transfer.
Water Charges and Production
Impacts
In line with the policy of making irrigation
districts more financially sustainable, it was
recognized that the users would have to
pay the real O&M costs for the irrigation
service. This meant significantly higher
water costs for the farmers. Prior to trans-
fer, for example in 1990, farmers were only
paying 37 percent of the actual O&M costs
on average. Table 7 illustrates the changes
in irrigation fees as a result of transfer in
the Bajo Rio Bravo Irrigation District, No.
025 in the State of Tamaulipas. The author-
ized water fees increased from US$12.49
per hectare per year to $42.09 per hectare
per year in late 1993 (the district was trans-
ferred in early 1993).  Table 8 shows how
water costs increased in a number of other
districts after transfer.
TABLE 6.
CNA staffing before and after transfer.
Region No. of personnel No. of  personnel No. of personnel No. of personnel to be
before transfer needed after transfer retired or retired or reduced
(1990) reduced (1994)
Union Non-union
Northwest 3,467 1,023 1,660 774 10
Northcentral 1,881 525 696 633 27
Northeast 423 137 75 194 17
Lerma Balsa 1,587 363 682  551  1
Valley of Mexico 313 80 149 84 0
Southeast 137 16 30 90 1
Total 7,808  2,134 3,292  2,326  5619
For  total revenue generation from irri-
gation service fees, the percentage of the
users that pay is as important as the irriga-
tion service fee rate itself. Because in most
modules the users pay before they receive
water, Mexico has in effect achieved a 100
percent irrigation service fee collection rate.
This is in contrast to the Philippines where
the collection rate is less than 60 percent.
In the majority of the transferred irrigation
districts in Mexico, the users pay for the
water before they are able to schedule the
next irrigation turn with the ditch tender.
Therefore, the collection rate is around
100 percent in most of the modules. In some
modules, users pay a flat rate for water per
season per hectare. Under this system, in
some cases, users are allowed to irrigate
prior to payment, or they pay part of the
fee with an agreement to pay the rest of
the fee after the end of the season. In the
small number of systems and modules
where this system is used, the collection
rate is sometimes below 100 percent—al-
though those who owe the module gener-
ally have to pay their dues before they can
obtain water the next season or year.
As the modules are completely de-
pendent upon the irrigation fees paid by
the users, they cannot survive unless the
users pay their irrigation service fees. Ta-
ble 9 gives an analysis of irrigation service
TABLE 7.
Analysis of base service fees for self-sufficiency, Irrigation District No. 025, Bajo Rio Bravo.a
Year Water fee required Authorized water fee Degree of self-sufficiency
for self-sufficiency (US$)  (%)
(US$)
1989 34.35 12.49 36.00
1990 33.87 16.94 50.00
1991 35.94 13.98 38.00
1992 34.72 20.83  60.00
1993 42.09 31.25 79.00
1993-94 42.09 42.09 100.00
aService area=200,609 ha.
Note: US$ values are in constant 1993 dollars.
Source: CNA, Gerencia Estatal Tamaulipas.
TABLE 8.
Increases in water fees as a result of transfer in selected districts and modules.
District Modules Region Transfer year Water fee (US$ per 1,000 m3 % Increase
1992-1994
1992 1993 1994
Don Martin 7 North 1992 5.11 5.78 7.43 57
Culiacán-Humaya III-2 Northwest 1990-93 5.27 5.20 7.79 59
Edo. De Zacatecas 6 North 1992-93 3.10 3.07 5.33 85
Bajo Rio San Juan IV-1 Northcentral  1992 0.86 2.22 2.25 180
Tulancingo II Valle Mex 1993 4.41 4.37 5.94 45
Metztitlan I Valle Mex 1993 2.94 2.91 4.88 79
Source: Gorriz, Subramanian, and Simas 1995.2
0
TABLE 9.
Irrigation service fee collection in the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District, 1992-1996.
Module Irrigation service fee a collected (in constant 1993 US dollars)
The collected fee as a percentage of the planned (required) fee is given with parenthesis
1992-93 1993-94 1994-1995 1995-96
Acambaro 193,062 (77%) 260,125 (97%) 247,750 (63%) 454,687 (72%)
Salvatierra 839,687 (116%) 840,781 (75%)  802,031 (112%) 972,000 (130%)
Jaral 332,906 (116%) 381,437 (100%) 383,187 (135%) 348,875 (99%)
Valle 586,062 (146%) 655,844 (75%) 608,812 (118%) 757,625 (101%)
Cortazar 963,969 (147%) 1,064,969 (118%) 1,086,968 (137%) 1,067,844 (125%)
Salamanca 807,875 (136%) 888,375 (114%) 796,000 (130%) 863,000 (144%)
 Irapuato 255,437 (118%) 321,594 (67%) 264,156 (100%) 360,219 (122%)
Abasolo 615,812 (123%) 784,312 (88%) 819,343 (128%) 967,844 (139%)
Huanimaro 144,406 (81%) 178,094 (116%) 193,156 (132%) 172,719 (99%)
Corralejo 60,156 (126%) 94,687 (83%) 100,093 (286%) 197,406 (474%)
La Purisima 221,812 (117%) 237,187 (71%) 156,187 (126%) 237,406 (‘131%)
Averageb 456,471 (116%) 518,855 (92%) 496,153 (120%) 581,784 (116%)
Total 5,021,184 5,707,405 5,457,683 6,399,625
aIn the district, the amount necessary to cover all O&M costs is calculated prior to the irrigation season. Based on the expected amount of water in the reservoir, the number of irrigations that can
be supplied is determined. The total cost of O&M is divided by the number of irrigations to obtain the per hectare charge per irrigation. For example, if there is water for three irrigations, a charge
of US$30/irrigation/ha may be established. However, during the winter, unanticipated rains may occur, which means more water is available than expected. This water is sold at the same amount,
i.e., US$30/irrigation/ha, which then results in a collection rate in excess of 100 percent for the season.
bExcludes Corralejo as this module is solely dependent upon river pumping and the required iIrrigation service fee  is much higher than that planned by the district.
Note: US$1.0 = Mexican pesos 3.2.21
fee collection in the Alto Rio Lerma Irriga-
tion District during 1992-96. It shows that
the collection rate is often above 100 per-
cent due to excess inflow into the dams
from winter rainfall.
Although increased water costs to
match O&M fees  are important, the change
in costs as a function of the overall costs of
production is equally important. In table
10, these changes are illustrated for the Rio
Mayo and Delicias, large districts in the
Northwest and North, respectively, which
were among  the districts that were first
transferred. As can be seen in table 10, al-
though costs of water with respect to the
costs of production have increased since
transfer, the percentages are still in the 3-8
percent range, which is not unusual for
surface irrigated agriculture (Johnson
1995). In fact, in some irrigated areas, cost
of water as a percentage of total produc-
tion costs for crops such as cotton and veg-
etables has actually declined. For example,
in 1996, in Lagunera water costs for cotton
were less than 5 percent of the total pro-
duction costs.
Maintenance
The transfer program in Mexico was built
around a concern about the long-term
sustainability of the irrigation systems.
This concern resulted from the financial
crisis of 1982, as a result of which the gov-
ernment deferred a large part of the re-
quired maintenance due to lack of funds.
In early 1990, as the transfer program was
just starting, the irrigation budget was
US$109 million (Mexican pesos
225,630,760). User contributions were
US$40.4 million and contributions by the
government were $31 million for O&M
expenses and $37.3 million for staff sala-
ries. This was US$42 million short of the
TABLE 10.
Changes in the cost of water as percentages of total production costs.
Delicias Districta Rio Mayo Districtb
Crop 1990 1992 Crop 1990/91 1992/93
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Alfalfa 6.2 9.1 Alfalfa 7.3 10.1
Cotton 1.1 2.3 Bean 3.2 3.8
Maize 1.9 3.8 Maize 4.3 8.4
Wheat 1.9 3.2 Wheat 3.9 8.1
Soybean 2.1 4.5 Soybean 6.1 6.8
Chili 1.6 2.6 Barley 3.5 5.4
Peanut 1.0 3.6 Sesame 2.6 5.3
Pecan 2.6 6.7 Tomato 2.7 6.1
Oat 2.6 4.4 Watermelon 2.4 3.3
Squash 2.7 4.3
aTransferred in 1991.
bTransferred in late 1990.
Source: Valdivia Alcala 1994.22
approximately $150 million needed for sus-
tainable operation and maintenance for the
3.2 million hectares of publicly irrigated
land. Approximately 35 million of this
US$42 million was accumulated as de-
ferred maintenance (World Bank 1991). In
1991, the estimated budget was US$158
million (Mexican pesos 401,803,460) with
490 million (Mexican pesos 230,768,279) re-
quired for maintenance. By 1993, as men-
tioned earlier, the budget was calculated
at US$190 million  (Mexican pesos
609,540,000).
In contrast to 1990, the 1993 irrigation
fees collected by the users alone were
US$163 million while in 1994 they were
$170 million. The user-provided funds have
been used by the modules to operate the
systems, and in particular, to maintain the
systems including completing some of the
deferred maintenance. Figure 5 shows the
amount of sediment removed using these
funds, during 1984-95. The amount of sedi-
ment removed from canals and drains in-
creased more than five times after irriga-
tion management transfer in the district.
Not only have the modules increased the
amount of sediment removed, but they
have also increased the amount of weed-
ing and maintenance of canal roads. In ad-
dition, the modules have started to address
some of the deferred maintenance of ca-
nals and drains—many of which have not
been maintained for more than 10 years
(Ramos Valdes 1996).
FIGURE 5.
Sediment removal in canal drains by CNA and modules in the Alto Rio Lerma Irrigation District.
Data from CNA and modules.23
The irrigation service fees presently
being collected are adequate to cover the
O&M costs, and in some years a small per-
centage of the deferred maintenance. Tak-
ing into account all the required deferred
maintenance and other types of rehabilita-
tion, a recent study by the Postgraduate
College of Agriculture estimated the re-
quired investment at about US$559 million
(Mexican pesos 44,247 million). On a per
hectare basis this works out to about
US$186 per hectare. With an average serv-
ice fee of US$40/ha, spreading this cost
over a 5-year period (ignoring interest)
would almost exactly double irrigation fees
from $40/ha to $78/ha. Including interest
of 12 percent over 5 years, the total irriga-
tion service fee would increase to US$105/
ha. This is quite high and may be at an un-
economical level for many users, especially
those growing bean and grain crops.
Crop Production and Patterns
To date, transfer in Mexico has not had a
major impact on crop production. Al-
though increased production was not an
explicit objective of the transfer program,
with improved irrigation service, crop pro-
duction was expected to increase over
time. The lack of production impact can
be explained by a number of factors, the
most important being  that transfer was
originally focused on areas where agricul-
tural production levels were already quite
high. In addition, the financial crisis of
1995-06 as well as the drought that struck
the irrigation districts in the northeast,
north, and northwest tended to reduce
available water supply and other inputs,
which have led to reduced crop produc-
tion.
With significantly increased irrigation
service fees, the cropping patterns are ex-
pected to change from lower-value to
higher-value crops. This is happening in
some areas, with a shift away from bean
and grain crops to vegetables, and fruit and
fiber crops.
However, the shift to higher-value
crops is driven by financial changes in the
economy as well as changes in the agricul-
ture sector and, hence, can only partially
be attributed to the transfer program.
Landownership Changes
Changes in article 27 of the constitution
allow the ejido farmers to rent and sell their
land and water. Some writers have ex-
pressed concern that this will lead to land
consolidation and negative social impacts
on the small growers (Torregrossa 1994).
In fact, in a number of the transferred mod-
ules, ejido farmers have rented their land
and water rights. In Region Lagunera, for
example, in excess of 30 percent of the ejido
farmers rented their water rights4  during
1995. This appears to be an exception,
rather than the rule as in Alto Rio Lerma,
where less than 15 percent of the land and
water was rented out. However, it seems
there is a trend toward land consolidation
in the modules, which will have long-term
ramifications in the rural sector.
4Given the low rainfall
of less than 200 mm/
year in Region
Lagunera, the land is
worthless without the
water rights; thus the
farmers want to rent
the water rights and
not the land.24
Effectively, the transfer program started in
1990 and thus the government and users
now have 6 years of experience with the
program. Approximately 60 districts are all,
or almost all, transferred. The transfer pro-
gram has resulted in a much more stable
financial position for the districts. This has
been particularly obvious during 1995
when, due to the financial crisis, the gov-
ernment provided almost no operating
budget to the line agencies such as CNA.
In contrast to the 1982 financial crisis, when
the districts almost stopped operating due
to lack of funds and all maintenance was
deferred, during 1995 funds from the us-
ers not only kept the modules operating,
but they actually carried out some of the
deferred maintenance. The percentage of
the water tariffs that went to CNA provided
critical funds to ensure that CNA could
carry out O&M at the main canal and wa-
ter source levels. Removing such a heavy
dependency upon the vagaries of the fed-
eral government budget has improved
overall financial sustainability of the trans-
ferred districts.
The government now has to focus on
transferring the last 15 districts  (12% of the
total area in irrigation districts). These are
all problematic with the difficulties includ-
ing: (a) land that is located in an area where
there is civil unrest such as in Chiapas; (b)
irrigation infrastructure with structural
problems such that farmers refuse to accept
it before it is rehabilitated; (c) land with
very low productivity; (d) seriously pol-
luted water such as in Tula Irrigation Dis-
trict; and (e) areas where water is scarce or
where there are landownership problems
or both. To continue the transfer program
in these districts, the government recog-
nizes it will be necessary to change the strat-
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egy to one where the modules gradually
obtain self-sufficiency (Comisión Nacional
del Agua 1995).
In addition, the government is starting
to face some second-generation problems
with the transferred districts. This is not
particularly surprising, given the speed
with which the program was implemented.
The long-term success of the irrigation sec-
tor and the ability of the users and CNA to
sustain the transferred districts will de-
pend upon how the government addresses
these second-generation problems.
Financial Issues
As illustrated above, the transfer program
has significantly increased the actual funds
available for O&M. In most districts, these
funds have been obtained by a change to
volumetric prices for water as recom-
mended by CNA. The system works quite
well in that the users pay their water fees
and then present the receipt to the ditch
tender who in turn schedules delivery of
their water. With users paying before the
water is received, this system minimizes
problems associated with trying to encour-
age farmers to pay after they have already
received the water or at the end of the sea-
son.
There are two interlinked weaknesses
in the present water tariff system:
1. In the districts there is normally no
reserve fund—the fees are set at a level
just sufficient to pay the day-to-day
expenses for the modules. The modules
are literally living hand-to-mouth by
collecting the fees for one irrigation
cycle just in time to pay the salaries and
expenses for the next month. Therefore,25
they are not prepared to deal with an
emergency.
2. The idea of charging on a volumetric
basis seems logical, but it assumes that
the districts will always have water. The
lack of any kind of base fee that is
charged to all users separate from the
volume delivered, means that any time
a module cannot deliver water, its
income drops to zero. Without a reserve
fund the module basically goes into
bankruptcy.
During the recent drought in the Bajo
San Juan, Bajo Rio Bravo, and Lagunera
irrigation districts, a number of the mod-
ules either went broke or were on the verge
of going broke as they did not have a suffi-
cient volume of water to deliver in order
to raise the funds needed to meet their ba-
sic operating costs. As a result, a number
of modules are starting to recognize they
must change to a system of a base fee for
all users (probably based on land owned
in the module) and a volumetric system
based on the actual volume of water re-
ceived (or the number of hectares irrigated
as a proxy). Without this they are going to
continuously face the same problems they
faced during the last drought.
Subsidies
While the original objective of the transfer
program was to reduce government sub-
sidies to zero, due to legal restrictions it
has not been possible to pay the remain-
ing CNA employees directly from the fees
collected from water users. Thus the em-
ployees of CNA who are operating the
water sources and the main canals, as well
as the senior staff in the various CNA of-
fices are still being paid directly by the gov-
ernment. Consequently, the self-sufficiency
budgets quoted by the government and the
World Bank are not really self-sufficient as
they do not cover the costs of the CNA em-
ployees. These are still paid out of funds
provided by the Ministry of Finance. This
dependency upon a subsidy, although re-
duced significantly from the magnitude of
subsidy required prior to transfer, still
leaves the districts in a vulnerable position.
Water Law
As stated earlier, the government passed
a new water law to help address some of
the problems associated with the transfer
program, and the change to more commer-
cial agriculture in general. The water law
was passed in 1992 and the regulations that
support the law were passed in 1994. To-
gether, the two documents form the basis
for the transfer program as well as provid-
ing the legal framework to allow the sale
of water to higher-value uses (Comisión
Nacional del Agua 1994a).
Within a district, water user associa-
tions in the individual modules are granted
concessions once they fulfill all the filing
and registration requirements. In effect,
this entitles all the modules to a propor-
tional share of the water available for each
season to the land in the district.
 Therefore, no matter the size of the
module, for any season the allocation in
terms of cubic meters per hectare should
be equal for all modules. As one research
exercise in Region Lagunera and the Alto
Rio Lerma Irrigation District, IIMI staff col-
lected the data to determine how equita-
ble the distribution of water has been
within the district as a whole before and
after transfer. As can be seen in figures 6
and 7, the difference between the amount
of water received and the amount allocated26
FIGURE 7.
Difference between amount of water received and amount allocated before and after,
Region Lagunera.
FIGURE 6.
Difference beteween amount of water received and amount allocated before and after transfer,
the Alto Rio Lerma District.27
(where the zero line indicates a perfect fit
between allocation and received) has really
not changed much before and after trans-
fer. In figure 6, there is a single module,
Jaral, that is way off the zero line. In figure
7, the two modules that received less wa-
ter, Tlahualil and San Jacinto, can pump
water directly from the river and have ac-
cess to canal water as well. Consequently,
the volumes they receive are not really as
short as it seems from the data.
Concessions are for 5 to 50 years and
are renewable if concession holders have
not taken any actions that would be the
cause for termination as specified in the
law. However, the concession document
does not actually specify the volume of
water associated with the concession
(Gorriz, Subramanian, and Simas 1995,
Annex 1). 5
Without a firm volumetric water right,
the actual operating procedures are left to
the districts and CNA, but these fail to pro-
vide any guarantee of quantity of water for
those who buy or rent water rights. In con-
trast to the California system, Mexico does
not provide water on a priority basis, but
the water right is effectively defined as pro-
portional to streamflow, stored amount, or
canal flow. For example, if streamflow is
20 percent below normal, each right holder
will receive 20 percent less water
(Rosegrant and Gazmuri 1994b). However,
the Title of Concession does not clearly
define normal flow.
In addition to not actually granting a
volumetric right, the law defining conces-
sions also is unclear on priority in case of
shortage. Under the sections on agricul-
tural and urban use no priorities are de-
fined but under the section titled Basin
Councils, article 13 states: Within the scope
of the basin councils, the Commission shall
agree with the users on any temporary limi-
tations to existing rights in the event of
emergencies, extreme scarcity,
overexploitation or declaration of pro-
tected areas. In such circumstances, resi-
dential use shall have priority (Gorriz,
Subramanian, and Simas 1995, Annex 1,
National Water Law).
Based on this interpretation, the state
of Nuevo Leon and the city of Monterrey
have diverted the water of the Rio San Juan
into the Cuchillo Dam (Arreola 1996). Yet,
the water user associations in the Bajo Rio
San Juan Irrigation District have valid con-
cessions that have been approved by CNA
for this water and also have a 1952 agree-
ment signed by the President of Mexico
stating that this water belongs to the state
of Tamaulipas and the Bajo Rio San Juan
Irrigation District. This uncertainty asso-
ciated with their water rights has led to a
situation where the users in the Rio San
Juan are presently reluctant to pay their
water fees as they are uncertain about the
security of the water supply. As a conse-
quence, the sustainability of the irrigation
system is in doubt.
5This is seen in the fol-
lowing quotation from





istrative organ of the Sec-
retariat of Agriculture
and Hydraulic Re-
sources, created by Presi-
dential Decree published
in the Official Gazette of
the Federation on Janu-
ary 16,  1989, hereafter
called “the Commis-
sion,” hereby grants a
concession for the use of
water for irrigation pur-
poses, as well as a permit
for the use of irrigation
infrastructure, to the Ru-
ral Development Mod-
ule or Unit “Farmer-Us-
ers Association, Irriga-
tion Unit K-95, Upper
Main Canal, Irrigation
District No. 041, Rio
Yaqui, A.C.,” forming




The transfer program in Mexico took off
even faster than planned. Consequently, by
the end of 1996, more than 88 percent of
the 3.3 million hectares of publicly irrigated
land in the country had been transferred
to joint management. Water user associa-
tions have proven capable of operating and
maintaining the modules, even up to sizes
in excess of 50,000 hectares, and water fees
collected by the users have not only sup-
ported the module O&M activities but
have also funded most of the O&M activi-
ties by CNA staff at the main canal and
water source levels. This is in sharp con-
trast to the situation that existed when the
systems were heavily dependent upon
government subsidies and consequently
were deteriorating rapidly due to lack of
stable funding.
The number of CNA staff has been re-
duced significantly and, in most districts,
the systems are being operated with less
staff, although in many cases the modules
have recruited staff with higher levels of
training. The elimination of unionized staff
controlling O&M activities has removed
one of the major complaints of the farm-
ers. It has been reported that the ability to
hire and fire their own staff has improved
the responsiveness of the operational staff
to the needs of the users. With increased
O&M budgets including more funds for
maintenance,  and more responsive staff,
the transfer program has created a situa-
tion that is much more sustainable than the
situation in the irrigated sector prior to
transfer.
For long-term sustainability, there are
additional changes that are required to en-
sure the program is sustainable over time.
The system of water fees needs to be
Conclusions
changed so that the districts develop a re-
serve fund for emergencies, future replace-
ment, and rehabilitation. They also need
to shift to a system where the module col-
lects a fixed amount to pay the costs of the
staff and other facilities of the module as
well as a volumetric fee to cover the vari-
able costs of delivering water.
When a major city in the country can
expropriate the total water supply from an
irrigation district that is operating under a
legal water concession, such as the case of
the Bjo Rio San Juan Irrigation District, then
the irrigation districts are in a vulnerable
position. With its population growth rate
as well as the structural transformation
from an agricultural society to an indus-
trial nation, the competition for water is
increasing. Yet, Mexico’s legal system does
not clearly specify what rights exist for ir-
rigated agriculture and how those rights
can be protected against demands for wa-
ter from municipal as well as industrial
users. The government has recognized the
problem with the water law and is pres-
ently working to clarify terms of the law
pertaining to water concessions to reduce
future water conflicts between agricultural,
municipal, and industrial users.
Mexico’s experience with irrigation
management transfer is breaking new
ground in redefining the relationship be-
tween the irrigation users and the State.
This program is important for Mexico as
well as for many other developing coun-
tries that are in the process of shifting irri-
gation management responsibility to the
users. Many countries are watching Mexico
to see if the positive impacts of irrigation
transfer in the country in the longer term
outweigh the negative ones.29
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